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ARGUMENT
1.

Misapprehension of the Procedural History.

The Court's opinion asserts that this Petition was not filed
until after Appellant's Petition for Certiorari was denied by the
Supreme Court of the United States on February 29, 1988.

Andrews

v. Shulson fsic]. No. 880024, filed October 27, 1988, at Slip op.
2.

This is incorrect.

In fact, this Petition was filed on

October 23, 1987, long before the Supreme Court's ruling on
Appellant's Petition for Certiorari.

The event that triggered

the filing of this Petition was not the termination of the
original federal habeas proceedings, but this Court's decision in
State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421 (Utah 1986).

See Affidavit of

Timothy K. Ford, Petitioner's Addendum at 11.
The facts surrounding this important aspect of the
procedural history of this case are undisputed.

The Court's

opinion should be corrected to eliminate its misstatement on this
point.
2.

Misapprehension of Federal Law.

The Court has misapprehended the federal law regarding abuse
of the writ, which it purports to follow.

Slip op. at 3.

The

cases the Court relies upon all dealt with situations where
"claims that could have been presented years ago were brought
forward—often in a piecemeal fashion—only after the execution
date is set or becomes imminent."

See Woodard v. Hutchins, 464

U.S. 377, 380 (1984); Anton v. Duqqer, 465 U.S. 200, 203 (1984);
Straight v. Wainwriaht, 476 U.S. 1132, 1133 (1986).

2

As noted

above, that was not the case here.

In addition, all of the cases

the opinion cites involved situations where the petitioner did
"not explain why he failed to include his challenge ... in his
prior habeas petition."

Woodard v. Hutchins, 464 U.S. at 380;

see Straight v. Wainwright, 476 U.S. at 1134; Anton v. Dugger,
465 U.S. at 206.

Petitioner here offered several explanations

and asked for an evidentiary hearing to prove any aspect of them
the Respondent questioned.

The Court's opinion assumes the

record is complete on this point, overlooking that request for a
hearing and the District Court1s erroneous denial of it.
The Court also misapprehends federal law in its citation of
several federal cases for the proposition that "raising issues in
a petition that were not but could have been raised in a previous
petition, except where good cause is shown, constitutes an abuse
of the writ and requires dismissal of the petition."
3.

Slip op. at

In reality, the federal courts hold that failure to assert a

constitutional right or privilege at a time "when the right or
privilege was of doubtful existence", followed by the assertion
of the claim after a new United States Supreme Court precedent
establishes its validity, "constitutes no abuse of the writ of
habeas corpus."

Smith v. Yeager, 393 U.S. 122, 126 (1968).

Only

one of the federal circuits has adopted the radically different
rule this Court does, equating successive habeas corpus petitions
based on new law with procedurally defaulted claims.
Estelle. 722 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1983).

Jones v.

The other federal

circuits hold to the contrary, and the issue is presently pending

3

before the Supreme Court of the United States.

See Moore v.

Kemp, 824 F.2d 874 (11th Cir. 1987), cert, granted, U.S. Supreme
Court No. 87-1104 (April 18, 1988). 1
The Court also misapprehends federal law in its failure to
recognize that the "abuse of the writ doctrine should be governed
by equitable principles."

Stephens v. Kemp, 104 S.Ct. 562, 563

(1983); Sanders v. United States, 371 U.S. 117 (1963).

The

Court's opinion, while purporting to follow the federal rule in
this area, overlooks that crucial part of it—which alone
justifies review here, as Justice Durham's dissent points out.
3.

Failure to Address the Issue of the Right to Counsel.

The Court's opinion overlooks, and does not address, the
question of the right to appointed counsel in Utah postconviction proceedings.

As Petitioner's Briefs have pointed out,

this issue is relevant not only to the propriety of the trial
court's refusal to appoint counsel to represent Petitioner below,
but also to the question of "cause" for the alleged procedural
default in the prior post-conviction petition, on which the
Court's opinion rests.

See Appellant's Brief at 45 n.31;

Appellant's Reply Brief at 13 n.ll.
On October 31, 1988, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
review the en banc decision in Giarrantano v. Murray, 847 F.2d
1118 (4th Cir. 1988), which held that there is a constitutional
right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings in capital
^•To minimize delay in federal review, the Court may wish to
hold this Petition until Moore is decided and these federal law
issues are resolved.

4

cases.

Because this issue of Utah law is unresolved, and will

inevitably have a direct impact on any federal court's assessment
of this case on certiorari or in habeas corpus, the Court's
opinion should address that question.
4.

Compounding the Constitutional Violation.

The Court has granted Respondent's request that this Court
depart from its prior practice, by refusing to address in any
manner the merits of Petitioner's constitutional claims.
Respondent asked this, not for any valid state reason, but for
the sole purpose of cutting of Petitioner's access to federal
court on these issues.

By granting that request, the Court has

constructed a special rule barring only the Petitioner's attempts
to obtain review in this particular case.
A state court procedural rule, constructed for the purpose
of cutting off federal review of federal constitutional issues,
is not an independent and adequate state ground.
Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965).

Henry v.

The federal courts will not,

and should not, recognize bars imposed by state procedural rules
unless they are "strictly or regularly" followed.
Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 262 (1982).
plain:

Hathorn v.

The reasons for this "are

the state court may be attempting to evade Supreme Court

review by interposing a state law ground."

Meltzer, State Court

Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 Harv.L.Rev. 1128, 1138 (1986).
The State's arguments in this case, followed by this Court's
acceptance of them without explanation for its departure from
past practice, can support no other inference but that this

5
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Respectfully submitted,

'<_•
Timothy K. Ford f&>-^
Attorney for Petitioner
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